13 Things That Saved Apollo 13, Part 5: Unexplained Shutdown of the Saturn V Center Engine

Apollo 13 launch. Credit: NASA

Note: To celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Apollo 13 mission, for 13 days, Universe Today will feature “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13,” discussing different turning points of the mission with NASA engineer Jerry Woodfill.

While oxygen tank number two on the Apollo 13 spacecraft was an accident waiting to happen, another problem on the Saturn V rocket could have destroyed Apollo 13 before it reached Earth orbit. During the second-stage boost, the center – or inboard — engine shut down two minutes early. The shutdown wasn’t a problem, as the other four engines were able to compensate for the loss by operating for an extra four minutes. But why the engine shut down is a mystery that may have saved the mission.

“A catastrophic failure should have ensued,” said Apollo engineer Jerry Woodfill, “and would have, except for the unexplained behavior of the engine’s shutoff system. In fact, even the NASA Apollo 13 accident report fails to deal with the seriousness of the event.”

When the center engine shut down, it caused a few moments of uneasiness for Mission Control and the crew. Speaking after the flight, Commander Jim Lovell said that when NASA gave them the OK to carry on with the flight, “We all breathed a sigh of relief on the spacecraft. Hey, that was our crisis over with and we thought we’d have a smooth flight from then on.”

Woodfill said that the quick assessment in Mission Control was that a minor electrical signal failed to keep the engine operating so that it shut down prematurely. But that wasn’t the problem.
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What happened was the Saturn V rocket experienced dangerous so-called “pogo” thrust oscillations, a problem NASA knew about. While a fix had been planned for Apollo 14, time did not permit its implementation on Apollo 13’s Saturn V.

“While a clerical error caused Apollo 13’s oxygen tank to explode,” said Woodfill, “because its heater design had not been updated for 65 volt operation, and the tank was a virtual bomb (see Part 1), similarly NASA’s failure to fix a known serious booster flaw should have destroyed Apollo 13.”

The Saturn V rocket had five J-2 engines, each producing 200,000 pounds of thrust, together creating the 1 million pounds of thrust needed for a mission to the Moon.

On previous Saturn flights, these pogo oscillations had occurred during launch. The phenomenon occurred as the fuel lines and structure of the rocket resonated at a common frequency. The resonance tended to amplify in force and potential destruction with each bounce of the “pogo” mechanism. So damaging was the phenomena on the unmanned Apollo 6 mission that an entire outer panel of the Saturn 5 ejected into space.

Launch of Apollo 6. Credit: NASA

“The oscillations are like a jack hammer and it was so dreadful on Apollo 6 that it tore off a panel on the booster, and threatened the mission,” said Woodfill. “Apollo 6’s orbit was supposed to be circular, but because of the pogo effect and failure of second stage engines, the orbit became an elongated orbit of about 60 by 180 miles.”

Woodfill said if Apollo 13 had ended up in that type of orbit, it would have been bad but not fatal. However, Apollo 13 was a much different situation than Apollo 6.

The Apollo 6 mission carried a mock lunar lander of more modest mass than the “full-up” lander which Apollo 13 carried to orbit. With the added mass for Apollo 13, the pogo forces were suddenly a magnitude greater in intensity. A mission report said that the engine experienced 68g vibrations at 16 hertz, flexing the thrust frame by 3 inches (76 mm).

Woodfill said that if the center engine had continued running a few more seconds, the oscillations may have destroyed the vehicle. “That engine was pounding horizontally up and down, a quarter foot, at the rate of 16 times a second,” he said. “The engine had become a two ton sledge hammer, a deadly pogo stick of destruction, putting enormous forces on the supporting structures.”

What shut the engine down?

“It is, to this day, not fully understood, but it had something to do with fooling the engine’s thrust chamber pressure sensor that pressure was too low,” said Woodfill. He has studied the mission report, but says the complete analysis of why the engine shut down isn’t included.

“Though the shutdown command came from a low thrust chamber pressure sensor assessment, actually, the engine was operating correctly,” he said. ” The sensor had nothing to do with the pogo phenomenon. For some inexplicable reason, it was like something sucked the pressure out of the chamber and a sensor turned the engine off. But no one knows exactly why.”

Woodfill said those who later examined the situation said it was altogether lucky that the sensor shut down the engine. “Something intervened, stopping the engine from pounding its way from the mount into the fragile fuel tanks. This would have destroyed the Apollo 13 launch vehicle.”

As it was, the engine shutdown likely saved the Apollo 13 mission.

Tomorrow, Part 6: Navigation

Other articles from the “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13” series:

Introduction

Part 1: Timing

Part 2: The Hatch That Wouldn’t Close

Part 3: Charlie Duke’s Measles

Part 4: Using the LM for Propulsion

Part 5: Unexplained Shutdown of the Saturn V Center Engine

Part 6: Navigating by Earth’s Terminator

Part 7: The Apollo 1 Fire

Part 8: The Command Module Wasn’t Severed

Part 9: Position of the Tanks

Part 10: Duct Tape

Part 11: A Hollywood Movie

Part 12: Lunar Orbit Rendezvous

Part 13: The Mission Operations Team

Also:

Your Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (Part 1)

More Reader Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 2)

Final Round of Apollo 13 Questions Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 3)

Never Before Published Images of Apollo 13’s Recovery

Listen to an interview of Jerry Woodfill on the 365 Days of Astronomy podcast.

13 Things That Saved Apollo 13, Part 4: Using the LM for Propulsion

Engineers and flight directors in Mission Control for the Apollo 13 mission. Credit: NASA

Note: To celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Apollo 13 mission, for 13 days, Universe Today will feature “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13,” discussing different turning points of the mission with NASA engineer Jerry Woodfill.

After Flight Director Gene Kranz and his team in Mission Control had ascertained the true peril the Apollo 13 crew faced following the explosion of an oxygen tank in the Command and Service Module, they next faced a big decision. What was the best way to get the astronauts back to Earth? Do they get them home as fast as possible, or as safely as possible? The final decision they made likely saved Apollo 13.

“Immediately after the explosion, some recommended a faster return using the powerful service propulsion system (SPS), the engine designed for the retro burn into lunar orbit and the subsequent firing to propel the crew homeward to Earth,” said NASA Engineer Jerry Woodfill.

Using these engines to execute a direct abort burn would allow the crew to turn the spacecraft around, come around the front side of the Moon and be back to Earth within a day and a half. This was the quickest option, but it meant using the SPS, which were very near the area that had exploded on the CSM. No one knew if the engine had been damaged, too.

Vital stores of oxygen, water, propellant, and power were lost when the side of the service module blew off. The astronauts quickly moved into the lunar module which had been provided with independent supplies of these space necessities for the landing on the Moon. Years before, Apollo engineers had talked of using the lunar module as a lifeboat. Credit: NASA

The risk of using using the lunar module’s descent engine was an unknown. If it failed or blew, or if the burn wasn’t executed perfectly, the crew could impact the Moon.

The other option was to go completely around the Moon on a so called free-return trajectory, which would take between four to five days to get back to Earth. But would the crew have enough consumables to survive that long?

This flight plan, too, called for an engine burn to set the spacecraft on the correct path back to Earth. But should they use the SPS engine, which was designed for this maneuver but could be damaged, or use the use the descent engine on the Lunar Module, which had never been designed for this type of use?

In his book, “Failure is Not an Option,” Kranz said it was purely a gut feeling that made him choose to take the long way – to go around the Moon and use the descent engine on the lunar lander rather than the CSM.

“Later, Gene Kranz shared he felt a foreboding about using that engine,” said Woodfill. “Nevertheless, even the use of the lander’s descent engine had some risk. The system was not expected to be fired more than once on a lunar mission. It was designed for descent from lunar orbit to landing. To use it for both Apollo 13’s mid-course correction burn (to return to the free-return trajectory) and a subsequent firing to accelerate the journey home amounted to a second firing.”

With the first burn of the LM engines working as hoped, the crew swung around the far side of the Moon (some records indicate Apollo 13 traveled the farthest distance from the far side of the Moon, making them the crew that traveled the farthest away from Earth), Mission Control considered a second burn.

Without the second burn the ship’s trajectory likely would have successfully returned the crew to Earth approximately 153 hours after launch. This provided less than an hour of consumables to spare, a margin too close for comfort.

After a much discussion and calculating, the engineers in the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) and Mission Control determined the LM’s engines could handle the required burn. So, the descent engine was fired sufficiently to boost their speed up another 860 feet per second, cutting the flight time to 143 hours – which provided a better margin for survival.

Damage to the Apollo 13 spacecraft from the oxygen tank explosion. Woodfill noted the missing four Hi-Gain Antenna “horns” severed by the panel and shrapnel from the explosion. Credit: NASA

But what if the SPS engines had been fired? We will never know for sure, but Woodfill said the final photo taken of the damaged command ship after jettison from the reentry capsule appeared to show a slight deformation of the SPS engine nozzle. He believes the SPS panel adjacent to the exploding O2 tank severed the four horns from the mast of the hi-gain communication antenna system. Likely, the shrapnel from the devastating impact with those four dishes ricocheted into the SPS engine bell compromising its use. A hole in the engine’s thrust nozzle would have been catastrophic.

“The fiery bazooka-like blast of the explosion might have cracked the heat shield and damaged critical parts of that engine,” said Woodfill. “The engine’s systems were adjacent to the tunnel-like chimney located in the center of the service module. If the nozzle was deformed, surely, there would have been a potentially fatal consequence of its firing, akin to the loss of the Challenger resulting from the failed solid rocket (SRB) engine.”

Woodfill said that likely, the use of the SPS would have triggered the caution and warning combustion chamber high temperature alarm. “And its use might have made Apollo 13 a fiery meteor-like streak of light never to reach Earth,” he said. “Though a successful firing would have landed the crew days earlier in the Indian Ocean, the peril was too great.”

Tomorrow, Part 5: Unexplained Shutdown of the Saturn V engine

Other articles from the “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13” series:

Introduction

Part 1: Timing

Part 2: The Hatch That Wouldn’t Close

Part 3: Charlie Duke’s Measles

Part 4: Using the LM for Propulsion

Part 5: Unexplained Shutdown of the Saturn V Center Engine

Part 6: Navigating by Earth’s Terminator

Part 7: The Apollo 1 Fire

Part 8: The Command Module Wasn’t Severed

Part 9: Position of the Tanks

Part 10: Duct Tape

Part 11: A Hollywood Movie

Part 12: Lunar Orbit Rendezvous

Part 13: The Mission Operations Team

Also:

Your Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (Part 1)

More Reader Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 2)

Final Round of Apollo 13 Questions Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 3)

Never Before Published Images of Apollo 13’s Recovery

Listen to an interview of Jerry Woodfill on the 365 Days of Astronomy podcast.

President Obama Visits Kennedy Space Center on April 15

What role will NASA play in the future of US manned space flight after the shuttle is retired at the height of its capability ?

[/caption]A few details have finally emerged about Presidents Obama’s short visit to the Kennedy Space Center on April 15 to discuss his new plans for NASA as part of his 2011 NASA Budget Request to Congress. Obama’s visit to KSC will begin at 1:30 PM and end at 3:45 PM, when he departs for a longer visit to a political fundraiser. Check this story from the Miami Herald about the fundraiser.

In February 2010 President Obama announced the complete termination of Project Constellation including the Ares 1 and Ares 5 booster rockets and the Orion Manned Capsule. Project Constellation was proposed by President Bush in 2004 with a new vision to return humans to the moon by 2020 and then Mars thereafter.

Instead, Obama proposes to rely on commercial providers to develop ‘space taxis’ to ferry US astronauts to low earth orbit and the International Space Station. No one can say with any certainty when these vehicles will be available.

President Obama has not announced any specific plans, targets, destinations or timelines for NASA to replace those cancelled as part of Constellation. There are no current plans to develop a Heavy Lift booster. there are only funds for technology development.

There has been harsh criticism of the Presidents new plans for NASA from both Democrats and Republicans who see a loss of US Leadership in Space. Even Sen. Bill Nelson (D) of Florida says “President Obama made a mistake [cancelling Constellation]. Because that is the perception. That he killed the space program.”

This visit was initially dubbed a “Space Summit” by the White House, but will now span barely 2 hours in length (including travel time between KSC venues) and apparently not involve significant interaction with or questions from the many thousands of space workers who are about to lose their jobs.

The format of the visit has also been changed from a sort of town hall meeting to a formal address by President Obama to a selected audience of about 200. His remarks will be followed by brief breakout sessions on a few space topics to implement the new directives given to NASA by the White House.

Here is a portion of the Statement from the White House dealing with the President’s Remarks:

THE WHITE HOUSE April 12, 2010

Office of Media Affairs MEDIA ADVISORY: M10-054

PRESIDENT OBAMA TO DELIVER REMARKS AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER

WASHINGTON – On the afternoon of Thursday, April 15 President Barack Obama will visit Cape Canaveral, Florida and deliver remarks on the bold new course the Administration is charting for NASA and the future of U.S. leadership in human space flight.

Both the arrival and departure of Air Force One at the Shuttle Landing Facility and his remarks at the NASA Operations and Checkout Building are open to the media.

Air Force One Scheduled Arrival: 1:30 PM
Air Force One Scheduled Departure: 3:45 PM

President Obama Remarks at Kennedy Space Center
NASA Operations and Checkout Building

The opening session, including the President’s remarks, and the closing session of the conference are open to pre-credentialed media. The breakout sessions in between will be closed press and streamed at http://www.nasa.gov/ntv.

13 Things That Saved Apollo 13, Part 3: Charlie Duke’s Measles

The original prime crew for Apollo 13 was Jim Lovell, Ken Mattingly and Fred Haise. Credit: NASA

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Note: To celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Apollo 13 mission, for 13 days, Universe Today will feature “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13,” discussing different turning points of the mission with NASA engineer Jerry Woodfill.

Just 72 hours before the scheduled launch of Apollo 13, Ken Mattingly was removed from the mission and replaced by Jack Swigert from the back-up crew as Command Module Pilot. Charlie Duke, also from the back-up crew caught the measles from one of his children, and exposed Mattingly — the only other member of either the prime or back-up crews who were not immune to the disease. If Mattingly were to come down with the measles, he might contract it while alone in the Command Module while Jim Lovell and Fred Haise were walking on the Moon.

“I think Charlie Duke’s measles contributed to the rescue,” said NASA engineer Jerry Woodfill, who has come up with “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13.” “This is one that probably everyone disagrees with me, but it seems like the astronauts on board were perfect to deal with what happened on the Apollo 13 mission.”

Woodfill says his conviction in no way denigrates the abilities of Ken Mattingly. “Ken was a wonderful crew member,” Woodfill said, “and he is a very detailed guy who helped with the rescue of Apollo 13 in a magnificent way. In the movie, Apollo 13, they capture the essence of how he is an ‘engineer’s engineer’.”

Astronaut Charlie Duke. Credit: NASA

Although, ironically Mattingly and Duke flew together later on the Apollo 16 mission, were it not for Charlie Duke’s measles, Woodfill said that Swigert’s special talents for an Apollo 13-type mission would not have been present.

Jack Swigert. Credit: NASA

First of all, his physique was better suited to the harsh conditions he experienced in the inoperable Command Module, where he was positioned for most of the flight. Woodfill said that likely, Swigert’s brawn as a former University of Colorado varsity football player better served him to withstand the cold conditions and endure the small amounts of water that the astronauts had to ration among themselves.

Water was one of the main consumables – even more than oxygen – of which the crew barely had enough.

“Mattingly and Haise had about the same build,” said Woodfill, “which was not as robust a build as Swigert and Lovell. Haise ended up with a urinary tract infection because of not getting enough water.”

But more importantly were Swigert’s familiarity with the Command Module and his “precise” personality.

Screenshot from Apollo footage of Jim Lovell and Jack Swigert. Credit: NASA

“Among the nearly thirty Apollo astronauts, Jack Swigert had the best knowledge of Command Module malfunction procedures,” said Woodfill. “Some have said that Jack had practically written the malfunction procedures for the Command Module. So, he was the most conversant astronaut for any malfunction that occurred in the CSM.”

Swigert had to quickly and accurately write down the procedure to transfer the guidance parameters from the CSM computers to the Lunar module computers. And the procedure for the reentry of the crew to Earth’s atmosphere had to be re-written, with Mission Control calling up to the crew with hundreds of changes to the original plan. “The team on the ground had to recreate a checklist and a procedural ‘cookbook’ that would normally take three months to create, and they had to do it in just days. Jack had to be accurate when he wrote down these procedures. And the communication system wasn’t always the best – it was sometimes garbled or couldn’t be heard very well. While all the astronauts had to have orderly minds, Jack Swigert was a man of extreme order.”

Woodfill said an account from Swigert’s sister bears out that fact. She at one time asked her brother Jack to put away cans of frozen orange juice and lemon juice in her freezer. When she looked in her freezer later, all the lemon juice cans were lined up in orderly fashion, with the orange juice cans neatly lined up in an adjacent row. Later, she asked her brother why he had neatly lined all the lemon cans in a row then a row of orange juice cans, and according to Woodfill, Swigert answered, “Because “L” comes before “O” in the alphabet.”

“The truth is, Swigert was gifted with a respect for extreme order and precision, and he was onboard for just that reason,” said Woodfill. “Every one of the steps in the rescue checklist had to be ‘in the right order’.”

Fred Haise, in 1966. Credit: NASA

And, equally important, said Woodfill, was the talent Haise brought to recording and rewriting operational procedures. “Fred had been a newspaper stringer for a small newspaper in Mississippi in his youth, taking notes and editing them for his local Mississippi paper’s stories. Utmost among reporters is accuracy in quoting sources. Those transmitted words from mission control had to be flawlessly transcribed if the crew was to survive, and Fred and Jack did an amazing job.

Remarkably, said Woodfill, each man’s talents specifically served the unique need. “Each man exhibited exceptional accuracy in adverse surroundings,” he said. “The lander was noisy, the audio sometimes fuzzy, movement unpredictable, temperatures cold, sleep scarce, and fatigue always present.”

Of course, those familiar with the Apollo 13 story know that Ken Mattingly never got the measles. But the role he played in getting the astronauts back home safely can’t be overestimated.

“Call it luck, call it circumstance,” said Woodfill, “but because of Charlie Duke’s measles the men on board Apollo 13 — and back on the ground — were perfect for the situation they encountered.”

Other articles from the “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13” series:

Introduction

Part 1: Timing

Part 2: The Hatch That Wouldn’t Close

Part 4: Using the LM for Propulsion

Part 5: Unexplained Shutdown of the Saturn V Center Engine

Part 6: Navigating by Earth’s Terminator

Part 7: The Apollo 1 Fire

Part 8: The Command Module Wasn’t Severed

Part 9: Position of the Tanks

Part 10: Duct Tape

Part 11: A Hollywood Movie

Part 12: Lunar Orbit Rendezvous

Part 13: The Mission Operations Team

Also:

Your Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (Part 1)

More Reader Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 2)

Final Round of Apollo 13 Questions Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 3)

Never Before Published Images of Apollo 13’s Recovery

Listen to an interview of Jerry Woodfill on the 365 Days of Astronomy podcast.

13 Things That Saved Apollo 13, Part 2: The Hatch That Wouldn’t Close

Apollo 13 launch. Credit: NASA

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Note: To celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Apollo 13 mission, for 13 days, Universe Today will feature “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13,” discussing different turning points of the mission with NASA engineer Jerry Woodfill.

When the oxygen tank exploded on the Apollo 13 Command Module, the astronauts on board and everyone in Mission Control had no idea what the problem was. In his book, “Lost Moon,” Apollo 13 commander Jim Lovell thought the “bang-whump-shudder” that shook the spacecraft could have been a rogue meteor hit on the lunar module, Aquarius. Quickly, he told Jack Swigert to “button up” or close the hatch between the Command Module Odyssey, and Aquarius, so that both spacecraft wouldn’t depressurize.

But the hatch wouldn’t close.

Apollo engineer Jerry Woodfill believes the balky hatch was one of the things that helped save the Apollo 13 crew. “They were trying to close off the only way they could save their lives,” he said.

In Mission Control and in the nearby Mission Evaluation Room, several engineers, including Woodfill, thought the only explanation for so many systems to go offline at once was an instrumentation problem. “Initially I thought there was something wrong with the alarm system or the instrumentation,” said Woodfill, who helped develop the alarm system for the Apollo spacecraft. “There was no way so many warning lights could illuminate at once. I was sure I would have some explaining to do about the system.”

Screenshot from Apollo 13 footage of Fred Haise floating through the hatch between Odyssey and Aquarius. Credit: NASA

At first, Lovell thought Fred Haise may have been playing a joke on the crew by actuating a relief valve that made a sort of popping noise – something he had done previously during the flight. But with the surprised look on Haise’s face, along with the noise and all the alarms going off, Lovell’s next thought was the hull had been compromised in Aquarius.

Like a submarine crew that closes hatches between compartments after being hit by a torpedo or depth charge, Lovell wanted to close the hatch into the Command Module so all the air didn’t rush out into the vacuum of space.

Swigert quickly tried three times to close the hatch, but couldn’t get it to lock down. Lovell tried twice, and again couldn’t get it to stay closed. But by that time, Lovell thought, if the hull had been compromised, both spacecraft surely would have already depressurized and no such thing was happening. So, the crew set the hatch aside and moved on to looking at the falling gauges on the oxygen tanks.

And shortly after that, Lovell looked out the window and saw a cloud of oxygen venting out into space.

Earlier in the flight, the Apollo 13 crew had opened the hatches between Odyssey and Aquarius, and actually was far ahead on their checklist of preparing to land on the Moon by turning on equipment in the lander.

Woodfill believes this was fortuitous, as was the hatch not closing, because saving time was of the essence in this situation.

“Some people say that doesn’t amount to much time,” Woodfill said, “but I say it did, because if they had closed and latched up the hatch, and then worked to find the real problem of what was wrong, then they would have to delay and quit working the problem to go remove the hatch, stow the hatch and go power up the lander.”

Why was time so important?

The fuel cells that created power for the Command Module were not working without the oxygen from the two tanks. “Tank 2, of course, was gone with the explosion,” said Woodfill,” and the plumbing on Tank 1 was severed, so the oxygen was bleeding off from that tank, as well. Without oxygen you can’t make the fuel cells work, and with both fuel cells gone they know they can’t land on the Moon. And then it became a question of whether they can live.”

But over in Aquarius, all the systems were working perfectly, and it didn’t take long for Mission Control and the crew to realize the lunar module could be used as a lifeboat.

Screenshot from Apollo 13 footage of Jim Lovell and Jack Swigert during the mission. Credit: NASA

However, all the guidance parameters which would help direct the ailing ship back to Earth were in Odyssey’s computers, and needed to be transferred over to Aquarius. Without power from the fuel cells, they needed to keep the Odyssey alive by using the reentry batteries as an emergency measure. These batteries were designed to be used during reentry when the crew returned to Earth, and were good for just a couple of hours during the time the crew would jettison the Service Module and reenter with only the tiny Command Module capsule.

“Those batteries are not ever supposed to be used until they got ready to reenter the Earth’s atmosphere,” said Woodfill. “If those batteries had been depleted, that would have been one of the worst things that could have happened. The crew worked as quickly as they could to transfer the guidance parameters, but any extra time or problem, and we could have been without those batteries. Those batteries were the only way the crew could have survived reentry. This is my take on it, but the time saved by not having to re-open the hatch helped those emergency batteries have just enough power in them so they could recharge them and reenter.”

It’s interesting when the hatch had to work correctly, when the lander was jettisoned for re-enty, it worked perfectly. But at the time of the explosion, it’s malfunctioning kept the pathway to survival into the LM open, saving time. Being able to get into the lunar lander quickly was what helped save the crew’s life.

Tommorow: Part 3: The measles

Additional articles from the “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13”
series:

Introduction

Part 1: Timing

Part 3: Charlie Duke’s Measles

Part 4: Using the LM for Propulsion

Part 5: Unexplained Shutdown of the Saturn V Center Engine

Part 6: Navigating by Earth’s Terminator

Part 7: The Apollo 1 Fire

Part 8: The Command Module Wasn’t Severed

Part 9: Position of the Tanks

Part 10: Duct Tape

Part 11: A Hollywood Movie

Part 12: Lunar Orbit Rendezvous

Part 13: The Mission Operations Team

Also:

Your Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (Part 1)

More Reader Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 2)

Final Round of Apollo 13 Questions Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 3)

Never Before Published Images of Apollo 13’s Recovery

Listen to an interview of Jerry Woodfill on the 365 Days of Astronomy podcast.

13 Things That Saved Apollo 13, Part 1: Timing

Damage to the Apollo 13 spacecraft from the oxygen tank explosion. Credit: NASA

Note: To celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Apollo 13 mission, for the next 13 days, Universe Today will feature “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13,” discussing different turning points of the mission with NASA engineer Jerry Woodfill. Click here for our preview article.

Oxygen Tank two in the Apollo 13 Service Module exploded at Mission Elapsed Time (MET) 55 hours and 55 minutes, 321,860 kilometers (199,990 miles) away from Earth. If the tank was going to rupture and the crew was going to survive the ordeal, the explosion couldn’t have happened at a better time. “Not everyone agrees with all the things I’ve come up with in my research,” said NASA engineer Jerry Woodfill who has studied the Apollo 13 mission in intricate detail, “but pretty much everyone agrees on this, including Jim Lovell. The timing of when the explosion happened was key. Much earlier or later in the mission would have prevented a successful rescue.”

If the explosion happened earlier (and assuming it would have occurred after Apollo 13 left Earth orbit), the distance and time to get back to Earth would have been so great that there wouldn’t have been sufficient power, water and oxygen for the crew to survive. Had it happened much later, perhaps after astronauts Jim Lovell and Fred Haise had already descended to the lunar surface, there would not have been the opportunity to use the lunar lander as a lifeboat.

But looking at why the explosion happened when it did shows how fortuitous the timing ended up to be.

The control panel of the Apollo 13 capsule. The module is on display at the Kansas Cosmosphere and Space Center in Hutchinson, KS. Photo courtesy Kansas Cosmosphere and Space Center.

The explosion occurred when Jack Swigert flipped a switch to conduct a “stir” of the O2 tank. The Teflon insulation on the wires to the stirrer motor in O2 tank 2 had unknowingly been damaged because the manufacturer failed to update the heater design for 65 volt operation, and the tank overheated during a pre-flight test, melting the insulation. The damaged wires shorted out and the insulation ignited. The resulting fire rapidly increased pressure beyond its nominal 1,000 psi (7 MPa) limit and either the tank or the tank dome failed.

The O2 tanks were stirred in order to get an accurate reading on the gauging systems, as the cryogenic oxygen tends to solidify in the tanks, and stirring allows for a more accurate reading on the quantity of O2 remaining in the tank.

But this was not the first time the crew had been ordered to stir the tank. It was the fifth time during the mission. And most interestingly, the tanks normally were stirred approximately once every 24 hours. So, why was it stirred that often?

In what Woodfill said was a problem unrelated to what caused the explosion, the quantity sensor or gauge was not working correctly on O2 tank 2. The EECOM (Electrical Environmental and Consumables) flight controller in Houston discovered that the quantity sensor was not reading accurately, and because of that Mission Control asked the astronauts to perform additional actuations of the stirrer to try and troubleshoot why the sensor wasn’t working correctly.

So, it took five actuations until the short circuit and the resulting fire and explosion occurred. If the gauge had been working correctly and the normal stirring of the tank had been done, that would have put the time of the fifth stirring after Lovell and Haise had departed for the lunar surface, and the rescue scenario that ultimately was carried out couldn’t have happened.

“Check the arithmetic,” said Woodfill. “Five actuations at 24 hour periods amounts to a MET of 120 hours. The lunar lander would have departed for the Moon at 103.5 hours into the mission. At 120 hours into the mission, the crew of Lovell and Haise would have been awakened from their sleep period, having completed their first moon walk eight hours before. They would receive an urgent call from Jack Swigert and/or Mission Control that something was amiss with the mother ship orbiting the Moon.”

Apollo 13 crew: Jim Lovell, Jack Swigert and Fred Haise. Credit: NASA

Who knows what would have happened to the crew? The fuel cells required the liquid oxygen tanks. This meant no production of electrical power, water and oxygen. The attached lunar lander had to be available. Likely, the two ships couldn’t even have docked back together. And what if the accident had happened behind the Moon without mission control’s help? Alone in the Command module, Swigert would have had difficulty analyzing the problem. Without a fueled lunar lander descent stage attached, lacking its consumables and engines as well as the needed battery power, water and oxygen, the crippled Command Module could not have returned to Earth with live astronaut(s). Not only would Lovell and Haise have perished but Swigert’s fate would have been the same. Even if the damaged Service Module’s engine had worked, no fuel cells meant the ship would die. The situation that the Apollo 13 crew actually faced was dire, but the alternative scenario would certainly have been fatal.

Woodfill contends that the quantity sensor malfunction assured the lunar lander would be present and fully fueled at the time of the disaster. It was an extremely fortuitous event. Had it not occurred, the timing of the explosion would have been far different and the crew would have perished.

Additional Articles from the “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13” series that have now been posted:

Introduction

Part 2: The Hatch That Wouldn’t Close

Part 3: Charlie Duke’s Measles

Part 4: Using the LM for Propulsion

Part 5: Unexplained Shutdown of the Saturn V Center Engine

Part 6: Navigating by Earth’s Terminator

Part 7: The Apollo 1 Fire

Part 8: The Command Module Wasn’t Severed

Part 9: Position of the Tanks

Part 10: Duct Tape

Part 11: A Hollywood Movie

Part 12: Lunar Orbit Rendezvous

Part 13: The Mission Operations Team

Also:

Your Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (Part 1)

More Reader Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 2)

Final Round of Apollo 13 Questions Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 3)

Never Before Published Images of Apollo 13’s Recovery

Listen to an interview of Jerry Woodfill on the 365 Days of Astronomy podcast.

Where Is NASA Going and How Are We Going to Get There?

Constellation Program. Image Credit: NASA

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Everyone seems to be a little confused and in the dark about the direction NASA will be headed if Obama’s proposed FY2011 budget passes. Yesterday’s hastily called press briefing answered a few question, but not the big issues of where we’ll be going and how we’re going to get beyond low Earth orbit. Yes, Bolden did say that Mars is the ultimate destination but everyone knows we can’t just pick and go to Mars. NASA needs a vehicle to get there, and getting there will require doing it in incremental steps, such as going to the Moon or asteroids first. There’s no plan (yet) for a vehicle and no plans for those incremental steps. Hopefully Obama’s “Space Summit” on April 15 will provide some answers.

I’m of two minds about this whole deal.

First, I love the space shuttle. I’ve just spent two months at Kennedy Space Center. I experienced the launch of Endeavour, got to see Endeavour and Discovery up closer than I ever imagined, saw behind the scenes processing, met people who work with the shuttles every day, and talked with people whose livelihood depends on NASA sending people to space.

And admittedly, any talk of extending the shuttle program makes my heart leap just a little. It’s a beautiful, marvelous, incredible machine – many say the most complex device ever invented by humans. And why shouldn’t we keep flying it? NASA managers like Mike Moses, Mike Leinbach and John Shannon say that since the Columbia accident we now know the shuttle and understand the risks better than ever. Right now, it definitely would be safer to fly on a shuttle than to fly on a new, untested commercial rocket.

And the jobs lost – not only at KSC but at Johnson Space Center, other NASA centers and contractors — by ending the shuttle and canceling Constellation means individuals who have these incredible skill sets for getting people to space may not be needed anymore. There are things they know that just can’t be replaced, replicated or restarted five or ten years down the road.

Bolden said yesterday that there should be new jobs under the new budget which provides more money for NASA, but nobody really knows yet how many and where.

One of the most poignant questions asked by a reporter at yesterday’s press briefing came at the very end: What’s to say that when a new administration enters the White House that we won’t come back to starting over again with a whole new program?

“If we execute the budget as proposed and prove that we are on a sustainable path, that is the best protection for a subsequent administration not having to change course,” said Lori Garver, Deputy NASA Administrator. “That’s the goal, to not be in this position every four years. These technologies we will be developing will allow us to leave low Earth orbit and go to interesting places. We’ll be able to determine the best places to go, and we should have the data to do it and the capabilities to do it that are more affordable, which has been the goal since the beginning to the space program.”

So this is where my other mind kicks in.

Change is hard. It’s really hard when people’s lives and livelihood are affected. But without change, we get comfortable and getting comfortable means we do the same things over and over.

Running NASA the same way ever since the end of Apollo, while giving us the amazing vehicle that is the space shuttle, has not gotten humans beyond low Earth Orbit, and I think everyone agrees we want to be able to go other places.

Last year NASA turned 50 and there were some comments about NASA reaching middle age and acting like it, too. Change is what keeps us young, and change keeps us on our toes. When you’re willing to change and get out of your comfort zone, you make a commitment to the unknown. And that’s what NASA should be all about. Our memories can’t be bigger than our dreams.

Perhaps the hardest thing about these proposed changes to NASA is that Obama and Bolden are asking for change without telling us exactly what the change is. Maybe they don’t know yet, but this is something we can’t just figure out along the way.

There’s the famous saying that life is not about the destination but the journey, or the other saying that the best thing about being in a race is competing in it. But most journeys have a map and most races have a finish line.

If the proposed budget and plan goes through, this will give us a shot at journeying beyond. Now we just need to know where we’re going and how we’re going to get there.

I started writing this to report on yesterday’s briefing by Charlie Bolden, Lori Garver and other NASA officials, but clearly it turned into something different. Here are a few links to articles by other journalists who wrote about the briefing and what might be coming next:

Reuters: NASA Maps Plan for Revamped Space Program

NASA Chief Maps Out Space Agency’s Future Beyond Shuttle by Tariq Malik at Space.com

NASA Chief Charts Agency’s Shuttle-Less Future by Seth Borenstein, AP

The Write Stuff Blog at the Orlando Sentinel quickly distills what the changes will mean for the different NASA Centers:

Plans for Kennedy Space Center under Obama 2011 budget

What JSC can Expect from the NASA Reshuffle

What Marshall Can Expect from the NASA Reshuffle

Houston Chronicle’s Eric Berger, The SciGuy: Job Cuts Worry Space Center Boss and Answers Coming Today on NASA’s Future

Congressional Reactions to NASA’s Work Assignments by Jeff Foust at Space Politics

NASA Announces Programs and Costs for the Next Five Years by Dennis Overbye, New York Times

And finally, this NASA budget page provides links to all the NASA documents published about the new budget

13 Things that Saved Apollo 13

The crew of Apollo 13 after landing safely. Credit: NASA.

On the night of April 13th, 1970, when the oxygen tank in Apollo 13’s Command and Service Module exploded, a 27-year-old engineer named Jerry Woodfill sat at his console in the Mission Evaluation Room at Johnson Space Center, monitoring the caution and warning system he helped create for the Apollo spacecraft.

“It was 9:08 pm, and I looked at the console because it flickered a few times and then I saw a master alarm come on,” Woodfill said, talking from his office at JSC where he has worked for almost 45 years. “Initially I thought something was wrong with the alarm system or the instrumentation, but then I heard Jack Swigert in my headset: “Houston, we’ve had a problem,” and then a few moments later, Jim Lovell said the same thing.”

And so began the most perilous but eventually triumphant situation ever encountered in human spaceflight.

2010 is the 40th anniversary of Apollo 13, and Universe Today had the chance to talk with Woodfill about his role in Apollo 13, a mission which many believe should have ended fatally for astronauts Jim Lovell, Fred Haise, and Jack Swigert. But it didn’t, and the mission has come to be called a “successful failure.”

What things were responsible for that success – the overcoming of odds – to rescue of the crew?

Since Woodfill was there in the thick of the action, he has some ideas on how to answer that question. But also, for the past 40 years he has studied the Apollo13 mission in intricate detail, examining all the various facets of the rescue by going through flight transcripts, debriefs, and other documents, plus he’s talked to many other people who worked during the mission. Fascinated by the turn of events and individuals involved who turned failure into success, Woodfill has come up with what he calls “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13.”

Over the next few weeks, we’ll share Woodfill’s insights and discuss each of those 13 turning points. What better way to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Apollo 13!

But for today, besides giving our readers a preview of what is to come the next 13 days, we’ll take this opportunity introduce you to Jerry Woodfill.

Jerry Woodfill working in the Apollo Mission Evaluation Room. Credit: Jerry Woodfill.

While attending Rice University on a basketball scholarship, Woodfill was inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s famous “We Choose to go to the Moon” speech delivered at Rice. Woodfill turned in his basketball shoes and focused on his studies of electrical engineering, hoping to become part of the space program.

He came on board at NASA just in time to work on helping to build the Apollo spacecraft.

“I spent years working with contractors, engineers, flight controllers and astronauts on the caution and warning system, or the alarm systems for both the lunar lander as well as the command ship,” Woodfill said.

He compared the alarm system to the lights that come on in an automobile when the battery is low or the generator isn’t working. “We had to come up with the best means of telling the astronauts they had a problem. We had to make sure the alarm system worked right. ”

Woodfill said that like most of the NASA team, he knew the workings of the command ship and lander more intimately than any of his college courses would have required, but that prepared him for any problems that might arise.

The Mission Evaluation Room. Credit: Jerry Woodfill.

During the Apollo missions Woodfill worked in the Mission Evaluation Room, which is NOT the Mission Operations Control Room (MOCR) or “Mission Control” as it is known. MER was in a building adjacent to the Mission Control building. Woodfill has written a webpage detailing the difference between the MER and MOCR.

“We were an unsung group,” Woodfill said. “We were there for mission support. We weren’t flight controllers, but we were experts. For other missions that were routine we didn’t play that big of a role, but for the Apollo 13 mission, we did play a role.”

Woodfill tends to downplay both his role and the importance of the MER. “Comparing the 1970s era MER to the Mission Operations Control Room would be akin to comparing the Queen Mary to a weekend boater’s cabin cruiser,” he said. “Likewise, comparing my role in the rescue to Gene Kranz and Glen Lunney’s would be more incomparable.”

For a truly unbiased opinion, however, Chapter 11 of Jim Lovell’s book “Lost Moon” (renamed Apollo 13 after the movie of the same name came out in 1995) details how important the people in the Mission Evaluation Room were. Yes, the “MER-men” were important!

While many may say the way Apollo 13 turned out was luck or a fortuitous turn of events, Woodfill said he tends to lean towards providence.

Over the next 13 days, perhaps we’ll find out!

And if Woodfill’s name is familiar to Universe Today readers, you may recall how he found the “lost” lesson plans of the teacher in space, Christa McAuliffe, and brought them “back to life” so to speak, as they are now being used by many teachers and Challenger Learning Centers.

Listen to an interview of Jerry Woodfill that I did for the 365 Days of Astronomy podcast.

Additional Articles in the “13 Things That Saved Apollo 13” that have now been posted:

Part 1: Timing

Part 2: The Hatch That Wouldn’t Close

Part 3: Charlie Duke’s Measles

Part 4: Using the LM for Propulsion

Part 5: Unexplained Shutdown of the Saturn V Center Engine

Part 6: Navigating by Earth’s Terminator

Part 7: The Apollo 1 Fire

Part 8: The Command Module Wasn’t Severed

Part 9: Position of the Tanks

Part 10: Duct Tape

Part 11: A Hollywood Movie

Part 12: Lunar Orbit Rendezvous

Part 13: The Mission Operations Team

Also:

Your Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (Part 1)

More Reader Questions about Apollo 13 Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 2)

Final Round of Apollo 13 Questions Answered by Jerry Woodfill (part 3)

Never Before Published Images of Apollo 13’s Recovery

Mother of Pearl Colored Clouds form above Kennedy after Discovery Blast Off

‘Mother of Pearl’ Colored Clouds form above the Countdown clock at the Kennedy Space Center Press Site about 23 minutes after the April 5, 2010 launch of Space Shuttle Discovery, as 3 excited Science Journalists point out (from left, Rob van Mackelenbergh, Jacob Kuiper and Ken Kremer). Credit: Jacob Kuiper

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(Editor’s Note: Ken Kremer is at the Kennedy Space Center for Universe Today covering the flight of Discovery)

Beautiful billowing clouds of all shapes, sizes and appearance always form from rocket exhaust plumes following a mighty rocket launch, whether it’s from the Space Shuttle or an unmanned rocket like the Atlas for the SDO launch (see my exhaust plume photo).

Well I’ve never witnessed anything like the magnificently colored clouds following Monday’s (April 5) predawn launch of Shuttle Discovery. They are known as “Mother of Pearl” clouds – according to Jacob Kuiper, Senior Meteorologist with the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI).

Kuiper and myself observed the launch together with journalist Rob van Mackelenbergh (Dutch Society for Spaceflight, NVR) at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Press Site, located across the street from the iconic Vehicle Assembly Building where Shuttle’s are prepared for launch. See our STS 131 Launch day photo mosaic below of the day’s thrilling events.

At first the wispy clouds were nearly all white and set against the still dark sky. Then the sky overhead was suddenly lit on fire with a growing multitude of these pastel colored “Mother of Pearl” clouds – also called “Nacreous” clouds.

“The Mother of Pearl Clouds began turning from white to hues of pink and yellow. Starting about 10 minutes after the launch of Space Shuttle Discovery, its exhaust plume turned into a magnificently colorful panorama. Generally, this continues until about 40 minutes or more after blast off”, Kuiper told me as we stood next to the world famous Countdown clock and gazed in awe at the colored clouds above.

STS 131 Launch Day Mosaic: Crew walkout to Astro Van and ride to launch pad; Discovery Blast off and Countdown Clock at KSC Press site at T Plus 4 Seconds; Pastel Colored ‘Mother of Pearl’ Clouds which formed above the Countdown Clock at T Plus 23 Minutes as three science journalists are in awe. Click to Enlarge. Credit: Rob van Mackelenbergh, Ken Kremer and Jacob Kuiper

“Launching northeast in the predawn sky here on the ground means as the shuttle and its exhaust plumes head to orbit they’re going to catch the rising sunlight and that’s what creates the spectacular clouds we saw on launch morning !” KSC spokesman Allard Beutel explained to me.

Mother of Pearl Clouds form above US Flag at Kennedy Space Center from STS 131 Launch Exhaust Plume. Credit: Ken Kremer
The wispy clouds are transient events – constantly evolving in mere seconds as they are blown in a multitude of directions. Indeed it’s quite easy to let your imagination run wild and dream all sorts of fantastical things ranging from mythical creatures to assorted life forms and even people. Certainly someone has sighted Elvis in the rocket plumes.

“Atmospheric layers between 15 and 85 kilometers height normally contain very low quantities of water vapor. But the final exhaust product of the Shuttle’s external tank (hydrogen and oxygen) provides an enormous amount of water vapor”, Kuiper said.

“In the very cold atmosphere layers, the vapor turned into a tremendous mass of ice crystals and tiny super cooled water droplets. These crystals reflect and bend the solar rays very efficiently and create a nice spectrum of colors”.

“The lowest clouds, turned pink and orange, because at that height the sun just rises and most rays are a bit more reddish due to a certain extinction of the atmosphere. The higher portions of the exhaust plume hardly experience any extinction,” Kuiper explained.

Graphic of Nacreous clouds over Antartica. Atmospheric layers in the Antarctic winter. Nacreous clouds show colours similar to those on the inside of a Mother-of-Pearl shell. The clouds only occur at high polar latitudes in winter, requiring temperatures less than approximately -80ºC to form. Nacreous clouds also known as Mother-of-Pearl clouds, are rare cloud formations which are composed of ice crystals and form when temperatures are well below the ice frost point which is typically below -83C. The only place where these temperatures exist is in the stratosphere, some 20km (6 miles) above the surface. © Dr. Andrew Klekociuk, Australian Antarctic Division

“The yellow/white light of the sun – there a few more degrees above the horizon – is reflected immediately and causes the yellow and white, sometimes blueish colors. In the lowest segment of the atmospheric layers starting around 15 kilometers height, nature is able to form these clouds under very special circumstances. There they are called ‘Mother of Pearl’ clouds”.

“In layers around the Mesopause (about 85 km), clouds sometimes appear in the weeks around June 21 (northerly latitudes). These clouds are called Noctilucent clouds – or NLC. Both types can be produced due to the exhaust plumes from a Space Shuttle launch”, said Kuiper.

By far the largest and most long lasting rocket exhaust clouds derive from the Space Shuttle because it’s the most powerful rocket in the US Fleet – although not for much longer after the shuttle is retired and the US completely loses its Heavy Lift boost capability.

Internet sources: www.knmi.nl, www.weerboek.nl

Earlier STS 131 related articles by Ken Kremer:

Spectacular Radar Failed Belly Flip (Video) and Docking links Discovery to ISS

Antenna Glitch hinders Data Flow from Inspection of Discovery

Discovery Dazzles with Two Dawns in One Day

Discovery Unveiled on Easter Sunday to the Heavens Above

Countdown Clock Ticking for Discovery Blast off on April 5

Soyuz Blasts off with Russian American Crew for Easter ISS arrival

STS 131 Launch Contrails over the Kennedy Space Center on 5 April 2010. Credit: John O’Connor

Flock of Birds fly in front of Pastel colored clouds which formed above Kennedy Space Center from STS 131 Launch Exhaust Plume. Credit: Ken Kremer

Wispy contrails from the launch of space shuttle Discovery on the STS-131 mission glow in rainbow colors in the early morning hours as the sun rises over the Vehicle Assembly Building at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Shuttle Discovery lifted off at 6:21 a.m. EDT on April 5, 2010. Credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

Spectacular Radar Failed Belly Flip (Video) and Docking links Discovery to ISS

Space shuttle Discovery comes out of its 8 minute long back flip maneuver underneath the International Space Station as ISS astronauts collect high resolution photos of the heat shield for analysis to confirm it is intact and safe to land. Credit: NASA TV

Space Shuttle Discovery performed a spectacular “Radar Failed” rendezvous and docking at the International Space Station this morning (April 7) at 3:44 AM as the two massive ships were flying in formation some 225 miles over the Caribbean Sea near Caracas, Venezuela. Discovery’s blast off on April 5 began a two day pursuit of the station.

Hatches between Discovery and the ISS were opened at 5:11 AM EDT this morning, bringing together the seven-person shuttle crew and the six-person space station crew, to begin nine days of joint work and operations. The primary goal of the STS 131 mission is to outfit the station with numerous new science experiments, install a new crew sleeping quarter and to resupply stocks of essential parts and provisions.

[/caption]Discovery’s cargo bay is packed with the 27,000 pound Leonardo Multi Purpose Logistics module built by the Italian Space Agency and a nearly 4,000 pound ammonia cooling tank.

The joint crew of 13 people marks several notable historic firsts in space exploration, including the largest ever gathering of female astronauts and Japanese astronauts in space.

For the first time in history there are four female astronauts simultaneously working together in space. Discovery Mission Specialists Dottie Metcalf-Lindenburger, Stephanie Wilson and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) astronaut Naoko Yamazaki join ISS Expedition 23 Flight Engineer Tracy Caldwell Dyson who rocketed to orbit just days ago on April 3 and arrived at the ISS on Easter Sunday.

This NASA image was taken by the centerline camera inside Discovery’s docking port as she initiates final approach to the International Space Station shortly before docking at 3:44 AM on April 7, 2010 during the STS-131 mission. Credit: NASA TV

Expedition 23 Flight Engineer Soichi Noguchi and Mission Specialist Yamazaki are the first JAXA Astronauts to fly in space at the same time. A horde of Japanese media and officials were on hand at KSC to witness the launch of Discovery. This space first is a source of great pride in Japan.

The flawless maneuvers linking the two giant ships together were conducted with “no radar” because of the failure of the high speed Ku-Band communications antenna normally used shortly after blast off on April 5.

The STS 131 astronaut crew led by Shuttle Commander Alan Poindexter had to rely on back up navigation systems to precisely track the station and guide Discovery to a position in front of the ISS and then gently dock at the Harmony module (Node 2). The crew are trained to rendezvous and dock without radar.

Station Commander Oleg Kotev and NASA astronaut TJ Creamer took high resolution images of Discovery’s heat shield during the 8 minute back flip maneuver to document the condition and integrity of the many thousands of critical thermal protection tiles fastened to the belly, wing leading edges and nose cap of Discovery.

The pair snapped hundreds of photos using 400 mm and 800 mm cameras through portholes from their location inside the Russian Zvezda Service Module. These photos will be thoroughly scrutinized by imagery experts back at Mission Control in Houston to look for any signs of damage to the heat shield before NASA commits Discovery to the scorching heat of reentry and a return landing back on Earth.

Earlier STS 131 related articles by Ken Kremer:

Antenna Glitch hinders Data Flow from Inspection of Discovery

Discovery Dazzles with Two Dawns in One Day

Discovery Unveiled on Easter Sunday to the Heavens Above

Countdown Clock Ticking for Discovery Blast off on April 5

Soyuz Blasts off with Russian American Crew for Easter ISS arrival